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Abstract
This paper explores the evolution of child labor, fertility, and human capital in the
process of development. In early stages of development the economy is in a
development trap where child labor is abundant, fertility is high and output per capita
is low. Technological progress, however, increases gradually the wage differential
between parental and child labor, thereby inducing parents to substitute child
education for child labor and reduce fertility. The economy takes-off to a sustained
growth steady-state equilibrium where child labor is abolished and fertility is low.
Prohibition of child labor expedites the transition process and generates Pareto
dominating outcome.
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  1.  Introduction
Child labor is a mass phenomenon in today’s world. According to the ILO Bureau of
Statistics, 250 million children aged 5–14 were economically active in 1995, almost a
quarter of the children in this age group world-wide.
1 The phenomenon is most wide-
spread in the poorest continent, Africa, but was not always the sole province of the
less developed countries: child labor was once common in Europe and in the United
States, too. In 1851 England and Wales, 36.6 percent of all boys aged 10–14 and 19.9
percent of girls in the same age group worked. The historical evidence suggests that
child labor has been part of the labor scene since time immemorial.
2
 Although the empirical literature on modern-day child labor is abundant, a
theoretical examination of the phenomenon is rather scarce. Recent theoretical studies
are Basu and Van (1998) and Baland and Robinson (2000). Basu and Van
demonstrate the feasibility of multiple equilibria in the labor market; one equilibrium
where children work and another where the adult wage is high and children do not
work. Baland and Robinson (2000) study the implications of child labor for welfare.
However, despite evidence about the positive relationship between child labor and
fertility and a negative effect of income on child labor, existing theories have
abstracted from the important dynamic interrelationship between child labor and the
process of development.
 3
This paper explores the dynamic evolution of child labor, fertility, and human
capital in the process of development.
4  In early stages of development the economy is
in a development trap where child labor is abundant, fertility is high and output per
                                                
1 See Ashagrie (1998). Many definitions of child labor are available. See Ashagrie (1993) for a
discussion of the definitions, classifications and the data available today on child labor. See also Basu
(1999) and Morand (1999b) for data on contemporary child labor.
2 These figures are from Cunningham (1990) who provides data on child employment in England
and Wales from the 1851 census and evidences on earlier eras. An historical discussion of child labor
in Europe, the United States and Japan appears in Wiener (1991).
3 See Rosenzweig and Evenson (1977), Cain and Mozumder (1981), Levy (1985) and Grootaert
and Kanbur (1995) for the positive relation between child labor and fertility. See Goldin (1979) and
Levy (1985) for the negative relation between child labor and income, and Barro (1991) for the
negative relation between fertility and income.
4 Although the literature presents several theoretical studies of the joint dynamics of income and
fertility, so far no theoretical analysis of child labor dynamics exists. Most of the literature which
presents theoretical studies of the joint dynamics of income and fertility tends to explore the negative
relation between income and fertility that has prevailed in developed countries since the mid-19th
century, e.g., Becker, Murphy and Tamura (1990) and Galor and Weil (1996). Exceptions are Galor
and Weil (1999, 2000) and Morand (1999a) who model non-monotonic relation between income and
fertility. Namely that at first fertility increased with income and only at some stage this relation
reversed.2
capita is low. Technological progress, however, increases gradually the wage
differential between parental and child labor, decreasing the benefit from child labor
and permitting ultimately a take-off from the development trap. Parents find it optimal
to substitute child education for child labor and reduce fertility. The economy
converges to a sustained growth steady-state equilibrium where child labor is
abolished and fertility is low.
5 Prohibition of child labor expedites the transition
process and generates Pareto dominating outcome.
The analysis is based on four fundamental elements. First, we assume that parents
control their children’s time and allocate them between child labor and human capital
formation. Secondly we assume that parents care about their descendants’ future
earnings. Thirdly we assume that the income generated by children is accrued to
parents, and fourthly that child rearing is time intensive. As a result, an increase in the
wage differential between parental and child labor increases the cost of child rearing
and decreases the cost of schooling, which is the child’s forgone earning in the labor
market. Thus, the increase in the wage differential (between parental and child labor)
decreases fertility and child labor and increases children’s education, and therefore the
wage differential between adults and children increases further in the next period.
6
Consequently, along the dynamic path to steady state, families become smaller and
better educated. We thus show that, consistent with the empirical evidence, child labor
tends to decrease as the household’s dependency on child labor’s income diminishes.
Since child labor abounds in today’s world, the question whether policy should be
applied to combat this phenomenon is of particular interest. Baland and Robinson
(2000) show that child labor may be inefficiently high when bequests are zero or
when capital markets are imperfect. In our model child labor is inefficiently high as
well. To see why, consider the following contract: Parents allow their children to
study their entire childhood and in exchange children promise to compensate their
parents in the next period, when adults. As long as the potential income of an
individual who invests in human capital her entire childhood is greater than the sum
                                                
5 This take-off out of the “pseudo steady state” resembles the endogenous demographic transition
in Galor and Weil (1996) and Morand (1999a).
6 In section 2 it is shown that the wage differential between adults and children may not increase
when technology is constant, but when technological progress is introduced, this wage differential must
increase.3
of incomes of a child and an uneducated adult, this contract Pareto dominates the
competitive equilibrium. However, Baland and Robinson (2000) claim that it is
impossible to enforce such intergenerational contracts. Here we show that a
government can solve this market failure by introducing compulsory schooling in the
current period and a redistributive taxation from educated adults to the elders in the
next period, a policy that needs to prevail for one generation only.
7 We show that this
policy not only Pareto dominates the competitive outcome, but also that it can
immediately launch the economy out of the poverty trap towards the high output
steady state equilibrium. This take-off out of the poverty trap to a growth path toward
the high output steady state is similar to the implication of policy in growth models
that study income inequality in the face of capital market imperfection such as Galor
and Zeira (1993) and Maoz and Moav (1999).
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the basic model of child
labor and fertility with constant technology and derives the dynamic system implied
by the model. Section 3 introduces technological progress and analyzes the resultant
dynamics. Section 4 discusses policy implications of the model and section 5
concludes.
2.  The Basic Structure of the Model
Consider a small, open, overlapping-generations economy that operates in a perfectly
competitive world and faces a given world rate of interest. Time is infinite and
discrete. In every period, the economy produces a single good that can be used for
either consumption or investment. Three factors of production exist in the economy:
physical capital, raw units of labor, and efficiency units of labor.
2.1.  Production
In each period, there are two potential sectors. Production can take place in either one
of them or in both. It is important to emphasize that the existence of one sector is in-
dependent of the existence of the other, and, as will become clearer later, the existence
                                                
7 This policy scheme formalizes the idea suggested by Becker and Murphy (1988) though their
discussion ignores the dynamic applications.4
of each sector is determined by individuals’ optimal choices. In both sectors
technology has constant returns to scale, but employs different factors: one
technology employs only raw labor, while the other employs physical capital and
efficiency units of labor. We refer to the former as “traditional” and to the later as
“modern.”
8




t L w Y = , 1 ; (1)
the modern production function satisfies all the neoclassical assumptions and is given
by:
() t t t t H K F Y λ , , 2 = , (2)
where Lt, Ht, Kt, and λ t are the quantities of raw labor, efficiency labor, physical
capital, and the level of technology (which we set in this section to equal 1)
respectively, employed at time t, and w
c  > 0 is the marginal productivity in the
traditional sector. Given the production technology, the competitiveness of markets
and the world interest rate, r,  firms’ inverse demand function for capital is:
() t k f r ' = , (3)
where  () t t t t H K k λ ≡ , and therefore,
() . '
1 k r f kt ≡ =
− (4)
The return to one unit of raw labor is w
c and the return to one unit of efficiency labor,
wt, is:
() () w k k f k f wt ≡ − = '. (5)
                                                
8 The existence of these two sectors can represent the process of urbanization. Thus, the traditional
sector can represent rural production and the modern sector can represent industrial production. The set
up of two sectors that produce the same output but employ different factors of production is in the spirit
of Galor and Zeira (1993).
9 For the sake of simplicity we assume that the marginal productivity in the traditional sector is
constant. As long as income in the traditional sector would grow at a lower rate than income in the
modern sector the qualitative results of the paper would not change.5
2.2.  Individuals
In each period, t, a generation of Lt individuals joins the labor force. Each individual
has a single parent. Individuals within a generation are identical in their preferences
and levels of human capital. Members of generation t live for three periods. In the first
period (childhood), t–1, individuals are endowed with single unit of time that is
allocated by their parent between schooling and labor-force participation. Children
can offer only θ  ∈(0, 1)   units of raw labor due to their (purportedly) inferior physical
ability and can work only in the traditional sector.
10,11 Their earnings accrue to the
parent.
12 In the second period of life (parenthood), t, individuals save their income and
allocate their single unit of time between childrearing and labor-force participation.
They choose the number of children and the children’s time allocation between
schooling and labor; they then direct their own remaining time to the labor market.
They decide whether to supply raw labor (and to work in the traditional sector), or to
supply efficiency units of labor (and to work in the modern sector).
13 The decision is
made according to the number of efficiency units of labor, ht, they have. Specifically,
they will choose the sector that maximizes their income, that is:
{ }
c
t t w h w I , max = , (6)
where It is potential income.
14 In the third period, this generation consumes its savings
with the accrued interest.
                                                
10 “Children rarely receive an income even approaching the minimum wage, and their earnings are
consistently lower than those of adults, even where the two groups are engaged in the same tasks”
(Bequele and Boyden, 1988, pp. 4–5). Thus, θ  can also be interpreted as discrimination against children
in the labor market in the sense that they get less than their marginal productivity. For evidence see, for
example, Bequele and Boyden (1988, Chapter 5).
11 The literature on child labor suggests that children are usually employed in industries where
technologies are simple and production labor-intensive. Many studies show that the development of
capital-intensive production has the effect of displacing child labor. See, e.g., Bequele and Boyden
(1988). Galbi (1994) shows the same impact for the industrial revolution.  Hence, we assume that
children can be employed in the traditional sector only.
12 The role of children as assets is important in developing economies. See Dasgupta (1993) and
Razin and Sadka (1995). Morand (1999a) introduces the old-age support motive when modeling the
demographic transition.
13 Canagarajah and Coulombe (1997), Jensen and Nielsen (1997) and Psacharopoulos (1997)
support the assumption of a trade off between child labor and their human capital formation.
14 It is potential income because it is the income per one unit of time. However, parents devote
some of their time to childrearing and hence earn an income equals to  (1 – znt)It .6
2.2.1.  Preferences
We assume that individuals derive utility from consumption and from the potential
income of their offspring in period t+1.  For the sake of simplicity, we assume that
individuals consume only in the third period. Thus, the utility function of an
individual who is a member of generation t is:
15
() ( ) ( )1 1 ln 1 ln + + − + = t t t
t I n c u α α , (7)
where  ct+1  is consumption in period  t+1,  nt  is the number of children of individual
t  and  It+1  is the potential income of each child in period  t+1, determined by the rule
given in equation (6).
2.2.2.  The budget constraint
As in Galor and Weil (1996, 2000), we follow the standard demand model of
household fertility behavior. We assume that a parent faces a time constraint when
choosing how many children to have. More specifically, we assume that time is the
only input required in raising children. We denote by z∈ (0, 1) the amount of time
needed to raise one child, implying that  (1/z) is the maximum number of children that
can be raised.
As mentioned earlier, it is the parent who allocates the time endowment of
children between schooling and labor-force participation.
16 Let τ t∈[0, 1]   be the
fraction of time allocated to schooling and () t τ − 1  the fraction of time allocated to
labor-force participation of each child in period t. Thus, given the assumption on the
physical ability of a child, each child supplies  () t τ θ − 1  units of raw labor to labor-
force participation.
                                                
15 This form of preferences and utility function follows Galor and Weil (2000).
16 Parents do not discriminate between children: each child gets the same schooling as its siblings.7
Schooling is free and hence the only cost of schooling is the opportunity cost, i.e.,
the forgone earnings of the child.
17 Therefore the budget constraint of the household
is:
() ( ) t
c
t t t t s w n I zn = − + − τ θ 1 1 (8)
In the third period individuals consume their savings with accrued interest. Hence,
() r s c t t + = + 1 1  . (9)
2.2.3.  The production of human capital
The level of human capital of member of generation t+1, ht+1, is predetermined in
period t through schooling. We assume that an individual is born with some basic
human capital and can achieve more by attending school. As in Galor and Weil (2000)
we assume that the level of human capital is an increasing, strictly concave function
of the time devoted to schooling. In order to simplify, we assume that the production
function of human capital is:
() ( )
β τ τ t t t b a h h + = = + 1 , (10)
where a,b > 0 are constants and β ∈ (0, 1) is the “adjusted” elasticity of human capital
with respect to schooling.
18 Note that since τ t∈[0, 1],   the level of human capital is
bounded from below by ab
β , the level of human capital that the child is born with, and
from above by  ()
β 1 + b a , the maximum level of human capital that can be achieved if
the child’s time is allocated entirely to schooling.
 19
                                                
17 Introducing direct schooling costs does not change the qualitative result of the model, as long as
they are constant. Kanbargi (1988) shows that in some Indian states, where education (and even books
and meals) are provided free of charge, enrolment is low due to the indirect costs of schooling, namely,
the child’s forgone earnings.
18 By “adjusted” we mean that β  includes not only schooling but also innate ability, b. Note that if
b=0, β  would be exactly the elasticity of human capital with respect to schooling.
19 Salazar and Glasinovitch (1996) and Schiefelbein (1997) point that child labor adversely affects
children’s schooling performance.  If we take this finding into account we should specify the human
capital production function as follows: ht+1 = h(τ t) = a(b + ητ t)
β  where η =1 if the child does not8
2.2.4.  Optimization
A member of generation t chooses the number of her children, the time allocation of
her children between schooling and labor-force participation, and consumption, so as
to maximize her utility function (7) subject to her budget constraint (8) and the
constraints on τ t and nt, that is, τ t∈[0, 1]   and nt∈ [0, 1/z].
20   Substituting (8) and (9)
into (7), the optimization problem facing the individual of generation t is:
() () ( ) ( ) [ ] { } () ( ) { } 1 ln 1 1 1 1 ln max arg , + − + − + − + = t t
c
t t t t t t I n w n I zn r n α τ θ α τ (11)
s.t.: 0 ≤  τ t ≤  1
0 ≤  nt ≤  1/z.
The following assumption is needed to ensure the existence of child labor and that
parents devote some of their time to labor force participation.
Assumption 1:
•   α z > θ








< + < 1 .
α z > θ  is needed to ensure that  (1 – α )/(z – θ ) < 1/z, i.e., that the parent devotes
positive amount of time to labor-force participation.
21   The second part of assumption
1 is needed to ensure that if parental income is at its lowest possible level, the parent
would choose a positive level of child labor. Note that the middle term is the
maximum level of potential income in the modern sector and can be thought of as the
gain from child schooling in terms of future potential income. The term on the right is
the ratio between the cost (in terms of output) of child rearing when each child just
goes to school and the cost of child rearing when each child just works.
 Thus, this
term can be thought of as the relative cost of child schooling. The second part of
                                                                                                                                           
work at all and 0<η 0<1 if the child spends some time working. For simplicity we ignore this finding
since adding this element will only strengthen our results.
20 We ignore integer problems and allow the number of children per household to be in the segment
[0, 1/z].9
assumption 1 implies, therefore that, if household’s income is the lowest possible one,
the relative cost of child schooling is greater than the gain from child schooling.
Let us now describe the solution to the optimization problem (11). Note that ht is
determined in period t–1 and hence the parent chooses the sector to which she
supplies her labor independently of the optimal choice of the number of children and
their time allocation to schooling, which we denote by ( )
* *, t t n τ . The optimization is
done in two stages. In the first stage, the parent considers the possibility that her
children will work in the modern sector in the next period, that is, she assumes It+1 =
1 + t h w.  She maximizes (11) with respect to () t t n τ , , derives a solution denoted by
() t t n τ ˆ , ˆ , substitutes  t τ ˆ  into the production function of human capital [equation (10)]
and obtains a solution to ht+1, denoted by  1 ˆ
+ t h . In the second stage, she compares her
children’s potential income in the next period if they work in the modern sector,
1 ˆ
+ t h w , to their potential income in the next period if they work in the traditional
sector, w
c. If  { } 1 1 ˆ , ˆ max + + = t
c
t h w w h w , then  () ( )
* *, ˆ , ˆ t t t t n n τ τ =  is the solution to the
problem. Otherwise, If  { }
c c
t w w h w = + , ˆ max 1 ,  then the parent chooses  0
* = t τ  and
differentiates (11) with respect to nt.
22
Depending on the parameters of the model two cases can arise regarding the




























. In this case, 
*
t τ is positive, regardless of ht. In the second
case, when θ q ≥ z, 
*
t τ is equal to zero for sufficiently low levels of ht and positive only
for higher levels of ht. Note that  t τ ˆ  and therefore  1 ˆ
+ t h are monotonically increasing
functions of parental income,  () t t h I . If the parameters of the model are such that
some schooling is optimal even when the level of parental income is the lowest
possible one, w
c, then it would be optimal to choose schooling when parental income
                                                                                                                                           
21A less restrictive assumption, z > θ  is needed to rule out an uninteresting case. We thank an
anonymous referee for pointing this out.
22 Note that if max {w ht+1, w
c} = w
c then τ t = 0 is optimal, because any fraction of time devoted to
schooling is chosen only to maximize children’s future potential income. If future potential income is
w
c, then education is a waste of time. Unpalatable as it may seem, this is probably true. See Bequele
and Boyden (1988), especially p. 6; Bonnet (1993); and Grootaert and Kanbur (1995), p. 193.10
is higher than w
c
, i.e., for every ht. Alternatively, if the parameters are such that when
the level of parental income is the lowest possible one, w
c, no schooling is optimal,
then there exists a threshold level of parental human capital (and a corresponding
parental income’s threshold), denoted by h
~
, such that whenever parental human
capital is below it, zero schooling is optimal and vice versa.
Equation (12a) gives the optimal schooling for the case where 
*
t τ is equal to zero
































































The first line of (12a) shows that children do not receive any schooling when parental
human capital below the threshold h
~
. Only when parental human capital is above this
threshold, children receive positive level of schooling as can be seen from the second
and the third lines of (12a).






















































































The first two lines of (12b) are relevant for the case where 
*
t τ is equal to zero. The
third and the fourth lines of (12b) are relevant for the case where some schooling is
optimal.
 23
Equation (13a) gives the optimal schooling for case where 
*















































































































































In contrast to (12), the distinction between the first line and the second line of
equation (13) merely represents the sector to which the parent supplies her labor and
the solution for schooling as well as for fertility is continuous in parental income.
                                                
23 Note that in (12b) nt
* is continuous at  w w h
c
t = and therefore the distinction between the first
line and the second, merely reflects the fact that the parent switches from the traditional sector to the
modern one. However, nt
* is discontinuous at  h ht
~
= . This happens because It is continuous at
h ht
~
= and the household’s income is divided proportionally between consumption and the potential
income of the children. Since schooling changes from zero to a positive level, child labor declines
discontinuously and therefore the income generated by the children decreases discontinuously. To
prevent a discrete fall in consumption the parent has to supply more of her time to labor force
participation. To do so, she has to rear fewer children and thus fertility decreases discontinuously.12
Note that from (12a) and (13a) it follows that the optimal schooling time, 
*
t τ ,
increases in time required to rear children, z; in the elasticity of human capital with
respect to schooling time, β ; and in the wage in the modern sector, w . Also, 
*
t τ
decreases in the wage in the traditional sector, w
c; in the children’s units of raw labor,
θ ; and in b, which represents part of their innate human capital. Similarly, from (12b)
and (13b) it follows that the optimal number of children, 
*
t n , decreases in z, β  and w
and increases in w
c,  θ  and b. Finally, it can be verified from (12) and (13), that
optimal schooling is a non-decreasing function of parental income, It, and that fertility
is a non-increasing function of It.
24
The following assumption is needed to assure that at the highest rate of fertility the
population does not contract.
Assumption 2: 1 – α   >   z −  θ  .
It follows from the solution to the household’s maximization problem that as long as
child labor exists, the optimum number of children is greater than  (1 – α )/z, which is
the optimum number of children without child labor.
25 Hence, child labor increases
fertility. Moreover, as the wage differential between parental and child labor
increases, the optimum number of children declines. Along with the decline in the
number of children, the time allocated to children’s schooling increases because the
relative importance of children’s earnings declines. This result might explain a
familiar feature of demographic transition: a rapid decline in fertility accompanied by
higher rates of growth in output per capita. It also implies a trade-off between quantity
and quality of children and that as the economy develops individuals prefer quality to
quantity.
                                                
24 Child labor increases the family income for any level of parental income and weakens the
income effect of the parent’s wage relative to the substitution effect. Thus, the result that fertility
decreases in parental income in a model with child labor, holds in any case where in the absence of
child labor, the substitution effect dominates the income effect, equals it or is dominated by the income
effect by less than the magnitude of weakening the income effect due to child labor.
25 Note that if the maximization problem was formulated without child labor, i.e., with the same
utility function, but a different budget constraint,  (1 – znt)It = st,  the optimum number of children
would be  (1 – α )/z,  regardless of  It..13
2.3.  The Dynamical System
The level of human capital in period t+1, ht+1, is uniquely determined by the time
allocated to schooling in period t.  Since 
*
t τ  is uniquely determined by the level of
human capital in period t, ht, the level of human capital in period t+1, ht+1, is a real
valued function of ht.  Thus, the solution of the maximization problem in each period
generates a first-order, nonlinear dynamical system in ht, denoted here by  () t h Ψ ,
which is given by substituting 
*
t τ  from (12a) or (13a) into (10).
PROPOSITION 1: If  z q < θ , i.e., if 
*
t τ  is given by (13a), then the dynamical system,
() t h Ψ , has a unique steady state equilibrium.













































must hold.  Otherwise choosing a positive level of
















































































, ,  () 0 ' > Ψ t h  and  () 0 ' ' < Ψ t h  which
implies that  () t h Ψ  is strictly concave and strictly monotonically increasing in that



































































,  () ( )
β 1 + = Ψ b a ht . Thus, there exists a unique h  such that
() h h = Ψ
PROPOSITION 2: If  z q ≥ θ , i.e., if 
*
t τ  is given by (12a), then there can be either
multiple equilibria or a unique equilibrium.
Proof: First, note that for  [ ) h ht
~
, 0 ∈ ,  () t h Ψ  is constant and equals ab

















> . Thus, the
low stable steady state equilibrium, 
β ab hl = , exists. Thirdly, note that  () t h Ψ  is












~ lim . If  ( ) h h
~ ~
> Ψ , the high stable steady state equilibrium must exist
because  () t h Ψ  is bounded from above and thus  () t h Ψ  has two stable steady state
equilibria (see fig. 1.d). If not, either  () t t h h < Ψ  for all  h ht
~
> and therefore only the
low steady state equilibrium exists (see fig 1.b), or,  () t t h h > Ψ  for some  h ht
~
>  and
then an unstable steady state and the high stable steady state equilibria exist (see fig
1.c). 
Note that the existence of the development trap, i.e., the low steady state
equilibrium, depends positively on h
~
 and thus from the properties of h
~
 the existence
of the development trap depends negatively on the time required to rear children, z; on
the elasticity of human capital with respect to schooling time, β ; and on the wage in
the modern sector, w . In contrast, it depends positively on the wage in the traditional
sector, w
c; on the children’s units of raw labor, θ ; and on b, which represents part of
their innate human capital.
The four possible shapes of  () t h Ψ  are drawn in Figure 1 and can be divided into
three groups: (i) The dynamical system drawn in Figure 1a. This system has unique
and stable equilibrium characterized by high income, a small number of children in15
each household, and almost no child labor.
26 (ii) Figure 1b, where equilibrium is also
unique and stable, but is characterized by low income, a large number of children in
each household, and extensive child labor, which we refer to as a development trap.
27
Note that for these two groups, the initial condition of the economy, i.e., the level of
human capital at time 0, h0, has no effect on the long-run equilibrium. (iii) The third
group consists of the dynamical systems drawn in Figures 1c and 1d. In Figure 1c,
there are three steady state equilibria: the low and the high ones are stable, and the
“middle” one is unstable; in Figure 1d only the low and high steady-state equilibria
exist. For these two dynamical systems, the initial level of human capital is crucial
because it determines the characteristics of the long-run equilibrium.
3.  Technological Progress
In this section we extend the basic model to allow for technological progress. We
show that under this process the poverty trap is only “pseudo steady state
equilibrium”, that is, child labor, fertility and output per capita are constant at their
development trap levels for long periods. However, at some period it becomes optimal
to launch the modern sector and begin the process of investing in more advanced
technology. At this stage, the wage differential between parental and child labor starts
to increase and the process of development as described in the introduction “kicks in”.
Our modeling of technological progress is rather abstract. Since the focus of this
section is the effect of technological progress on child labor and fertility dynamics
(and not technological progress per se) we do not model an R&D sector explicitly.
Nonetheless, firms choose the level of technology to be employed in each period
optimally. We rely on the non-rivalry property of technology as emphasized by
Romer (1990), resulting in increasing returns to technological progress. The dynamic
implication implied by this assumption is similar to the Goodfriend and McDermott’s
(1995) model where, in the first stage, development is driven by population growth
and in later stages development is driven by human capital accumulation.
28
                                                
26 The parameters can be adjusted so that child labor is abolished in the high equilibrium case.
27 Actually in this steady state children work all the time and get no education (see Grootaert and
Kanbur, 1995, p.191).
28 The process of development in the Goodfriend and McDermott’s (1995) model is driven in its
first stage by increasing in population size, which allows for specialization and in the second stage by
human capital accumulation. In our model development is driven by the stock of human capital.
However, in the first stage this stock is increasing over time due to population growth while in the16
Consider the production function described in (2) and define xt as the increment to
the level of the technology employed in the modern sector from period t-1 to period t,
i.e., xt≡ λ t-λ t-1. We assume that the process of upgrading the technology level incurred
costs to the firms, which are represented by the following cost function:
φ
t x P = , (14)
where φ > 1. In each period, firms choose () t t t x H K , ,  as to maximize their profits.
The solution is characterized by the following equations:
() k r f kt ≡ =
− 1 '













t t H w x ,
(15)
where k and  w  are defined by (4) and (5). Note that the increment of the technology
level, xt, is positively related to the aggregate level of human capital. This is due to
our assumption that the cost of technology change is independent of the size of the
economy.
29  Note also that the existence of the modern sector still depends on the
optimal choice made by the individuals as given by (6) where the modification needed
in (6) is that the potential income in the modern sector now becomes  t t h w λ . Thus
firms invest in more advanced technology (i.e., xt > 0) only if the modern sector is
launch, i.e., only if  () { } () t t t
c
t t t h w x w h w x + = + − − 1 1 , max λ λ .
Let us now describe the evolution of the economy under this specification of
technological progress. Suppose that at date t=0, λ 0, x0 and H0 are such that I0 = w
c.
30
It follows that as long as It = w
c i.e., as long as  () [] { }
c
t t w h w H w < +
− ) 1 ( 1
0 1
φ φ λ , the
                                                                                                                                           
second stage this stock is increasing (mainly) due to direct investment in human capital through
schooling.
29 This qualitative result would not change as long as we assume that the average cost of
technology progress is decreasing in the population size. Formally, if we assume that  ) , ( t t x L P P =
where  P is increasing and strictly concave in L the economy would follow the same qualitative
dynamic path.  17
economy behaves as if it is trapped in poverty: fertility is at its highest level, child
labor is extensive and consumption is at its lowest level. Note however, that the
potential income in the modern sector is increasing due to the growth of the
population over time.
31 Hence there exists a period t  such that upgrading the
technology level to λ 0 + xt and launching the modern sector is optimal. Denote this t
by  t ~ and suppose that the economy is at period  1 ~ − t .  An individual who supplies
raw labor and works in the traditional sector solves the maximization problem [the
first line of (13) gives the solution]. She finds it optimal to provide her children with
some schooling. From this period on, the level of technology employed in the
economy is increasing in every period and thus potential income is increasing over
time too. Consequently, fertility declines as well as child labor while consumption
increases over time. At a certain level of potential income the economy reaches its
new steady state: Child labor is abolished while fertility reaches its lowest level.
However, consumption (and output) continues to grow forever since the investment in
more advanced technology continues in every period. The evolution of the economy is
described in figure 2.
  4.  Pareto Improving and Policy Implications
As we explained in the introduction, the equilibrium of the model presented in section
2 is not Pareto efficient.
32 This suggests that a government policy may enhance the
welfare in the economy. Moreover, in the context of this model we are more
interested in the long run consequences of such a policy, namely, we are interested in
the question whether such a policy can immediately launch the economy out of the
low steady state towards the high steady state equilibrium.
Consider then an economy, which is characterized by two stable steady state
equilibria and is trapped in poverty (see figures 1c and 1d) and for simplicity ignore
                                                                                                                                           
30 In period t = 0 x0 is normalized to zero and hence the optimal level of feasible technology to be
employed in the modern sector is λ 0.
31 Galor and Weil (2000) assume that the rate of technological progress is positively related to the
population size. Kremer (1993) argues that regions that started with larger initial populations
experienced faster technological progress.
32 Even if individuals were two sided altruistic it might be that the compensation from children
when adults to parents would be too small and thus parents would find it optimal to send their children
to work. Baland and Robinson (2000) provide a comprehensive discussion on the issue of two-sided
altruism.18
technological progress. We demonstrate the existence of a government policy that
induces an allocation, which Pareto dominates the competitive one and pulls the
economy out of its trap by formalizing the idea of Becker and Murphy (1988) into a
dynamic setting.
33 We assume that there exists a government in the economy, one that
can execute a policy if it is Pareto improving.
34 Suppose that at some period t the
government declares the following two period’s policy (for period t and t+1) before
individuals allocate their resources. At the current period, compulsory schooling is
introduced at a certain amount. In the following period, the government collects a
lump-sum tax from workers in the modern sector and transfers the revenues to
compensate the elders for the foregone earnings of their children in the previous
period. Denote the policy by ( ) 1 1, , + + t t
cs
t σ ρ τ  where τ t
cs is the minimum time that must
be allocated to schooling of each child in period t, and ρt+1 and σt+1 are the lump-sum
tax levied on each worker in the modern sector and the compensation each elder gets
in period t+1, respectively.
35 Note that the individuals observe the government policy
and then choose the optimal number of descendants.
36 It is important to emphasize
that when the government picks the policy ( ) 1 1, , + + t t
cs
t σ ρ τ  it takes into consideration
the optimal number of descendants for each feasible policy it chooses. Given the
compulsory schooling τ t
cs and the compensation σt+1, consumption (in period t+1) and
the optimal number of children are uniquely determined. Let  ( ) 1 , + t
cs
t t n σ τ  be the
optimal number of descendants for each ( ) 1 , + t
cs
t σ τ .
The government scheme ( ) 1 1, , + + t t
cs
t σ ρ τ  is Pareto improving and pulls the
economy from its development trap if it meets the following sufficient conditions:
1.  ( ) 1 1 1 , + + + = t t t
cs
t t n σ ρ σ τ
2.  h w h w t t
!
> − + + 1 1 ρ
                                                
33 Becker and Murphy (1988) suggest a policy of subsidies to education and redistributive taxation
from educated children, when adults, to their parents through a social security system.   
34 A more realistic assumption would be that the government could execute policies that take into
consideration the welfare of the current generation alone. We take this restrictive assumption because
our objective is to examine whether government intervention can affect the long run equilibrium.
35 It is possible that the policy takes place more than two periods. If it does it can be denoted by
() {}
∞
= + + 0 1 1, , t t t
cs
t σ ρ τ . However we show that a two periods policy is sufficient.
36 Note that under this policy the number of descendants and consumption are the only choice
variables since compulsory schooling is binding.19
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is the level of the unstable equilibrium level of human capital (see figures 1c
and 1d).
Condition 1 implies a balanced government budget in period t+1. Condition 2
ensures that each child, when adult in period t+1, can earn in the modern sector a net
income, which is larger than the minimum income, which ensures that her dynasty
will converge to the high steady state. Condition 3 is a sufficient condition for (weak)
improving of parent’s welfare. The LHS of (i) is parent’s consumption in the low
steady state (without government intervention) while the RHS is parent’s
consumption when the government policy is introduced. The LHS of (ii) is potential
income of children at t+1 in the low steady state, whereas the RHS is the potential
income of children at t+1 net of taxes when government scheme is executed.
37
PROPOSITION  3: Suppose that the government decides on compulsory schooling
τ t
cs=1. Then for a certain domain of the parameters ( ) α θ , , ,
c w w  there exists
() 1 1, + + t t σ ρ  such that the generated allocation Pareto dominates the competitive one,
and takes off the economy out of its poverty trap. (See the proof in the appendix)
The rationale behind this proposition is straightforward. The introduction of
compulsory schooling solves the under investment of parents in their children’s
human capital. On the other hand, the redistributive taxation solves the compensation
problem from children, when adults, to their parents. In order to achieve an allocation
that Pareto dominates the competitive one, we only need to assume that the potential
income of an individual who study her entire childhood is greater than the sum of
incomes of a child and an uneducated adult.
38 The more restrictive assumptions on the
parameters are imposed to assure that the induced allocation would not only Pareto
                                                
37 For the sake of simplicity we choose to (weakly) increase both components of the parent’s utility
function.
38 Formally the condition is: 
c c w r w b a w + + > + ) 1 ( ) 1 ( θ
β20
dominates the competitive one, but would enable the immediate take-off of the
economy out of its poverty trap towards the high steady state equilibrium.
  5.  Concluding Remarks
In this paper we have explored the dynamic evolution of child labor, fertility, and
human capital in the process of development. In early stages of development the
economy is in a development trap where child labor is abundant, fertility is high and
output per capita is low. Technological progress, however, increases the wage
differential between parental and child labor, decreases the benefit from child labor
and ultimately permits a take-off out of the development trap. Parents find it optimal
to substitute child education for child labor and reduce fertility. The economy
converges to a sustained growth steady-state equilibrium where child labor is
abolished and fertility is low. We have also argued that the competitive equilibrium is
not Pareto efficient due to the fact that children do not have access to capital market
and lack of enforcement of intergenerational contracts. We have suggested a policy
that not only Pareto dominates the competitive outcome but also expedites the take-
off out of the poverty trap towards the high steady state.
Our result regarding the negative relation between fertility and income is well
established in the literature, e.g., Becker, Murphy and Tamura (1990) and Galor and
Weil (1996). However we have shown that it still holds when child labor is introduced
into the household’s decision.
As for policy, we suggested the introduction of compulsory schooling in a given
period and a redistributive taxation from the adults to the elders in the following
period. The need for such a policy arises since as Baland and Robinson (2000) claim,
the intergenerational contract where the parent allows her children to study their entire
childhood and in exchange children promise to compensate their parent in the next
period, when adults, cannot be enforced. Basu and Van (1998) find that a ban on child
labor is not Pareto improving since in the equilibrium without child labor, firms’
profits are lower. In contrast, Baland and Robinson (2000) show that a ban on child
labor can be Pareto improving if it induces certain changes in children‘s wages in
current and next period and in the supply of efficiency units of labor in the next
period. In their model a ban on child labor is equivalent to compulsory schooling21
since schooling is given for free (in terms of output) as in our model. However, unlike
in their model, we have assumed an open economy and thus a change in the supply of
labor has no effect on wages. We therefore suggested a redistributive taxation to
compensate parents for the foregone earnings of their children. Nonetheless, our
policy suggestion captures the essence of the intergenerational contract discussed in
Baland and Robinson (2000) and in this paper.
Appendix: Proof of proposition 3
Proof: Suppose that individuals observe ( τ t
cs,  σt+1).  From the solution to the
optimization problem (equation 11) it follows that:
() () () ( ) [ ]
() [] ) ( 1 ) 1 (
1 ) 1 ( ) ( 1 ) 1 )( ( 1
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substituting τ t
cs = 1 into nt( τ t
cs, σt+1)  we get:
1 1 1
) 1 ( ) 1 (
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Condition 3(i) holds with strict inequality for all σt+1 > 0. By substituting (17) into


































































































Note that the RHS of (20) is strictly positive. Note also that the LHS of (20) is








w b a w z
c
the LHS converges to zero. Thus from continuity there is a
sufficiently small θ  for which there exists σt+1 satisfying inequality (20).
Substituting (17) into condition 1 and condition 1 into condition 2 we get:
[] () [] 1 ) 1 ( ) 1 (
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Note that the LHS of (21) is strictly positive while the sign of the RHS is negative if
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 for all σt+1>  0 . This is sufficient for
conditions 1 and 2 to hold.
Thus for a certain domain of α θ , , ,
c w w  the desired σt+1 exists. 
39
                                                
39 Note that the choice of θ   does not affect inequality (21).23
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Figures 1.b-d: The shape of Ψ Ψ Ψ Ψ (ht) when θθθθ q > z  
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Figure 2.  Consumption, Fertility and Schooling along the Path to Steady State
under Technological Progress
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